Will the AML rules soon cover lawyers too?

On 1 June, the Federal Council launched a new consultation procedure with a view to amending the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) yet again. The latest targets to come into the sights of the authorities are “advisors”: lawyers, notaries, tax specialists and even accountants if they provide certain services, in particular company and trust creation, management and administration. Under this draft law, these professionals would, like financial intermediaries and dealers, be subject to the AMLA and required to perform the due diligence set out in it.

Concretely, the draft law covers any preparatory work or services supplied on a professional basis in the following areas:

  • creating, administering and managing legal entities or structures;
  • organising contributions to these;
  • purchasing and selling companies;
  • providing an address or premises to house the head offices of relevant structures;
  • acting as a nominee shareholder for these entities, or providing assistance for this.

As readers will recall, these activities are only currently subject to the AMLA if the intermediary accepts assets belonging to others or holds them on deposit, or assists in investing or transferring them. The same applies to activities carried out as an executive body of a domiciliary company. If advisors do not handle flows of money, they are not subject to the AMLA. The draft law, which is based on relevant recommendations from FATF, constitutes a new departure for Swiss legislation, in particular as regards lawyers. Up until now, the services they provide were divided simply into traditional (advisory services, legal representation, etc.) and non-traditional (trustee services, asset management, etc.).

Defining the concept for a structure will also fall within the scope of the AMLA.

It will therefore encompass trusts and all offshore companies (both trading and non-trading) and Swiss domiciliary companies (which are of course different from commercial companies because they are generally created simply to hold and administer assets). Swiss trading companies are excluded. Because of the safeguards in place when a Swiss company is created (capital payment account, requirement to use a notary, foundation report, etc.), the Federal Council considers that only foreign companies pose a risk.

The duty of due diligence imposed on “advisors” will be very similar to that currently applied to dealers. It includes requirements to check the identity of the contracting partner, identify the beneficial owner, create and keep documents and clarify the background to and aim of the services to be supplied. Lawyers will need to organise themselves appropriately.

However, if the lawyer suspects money laundering or terrorist financing, or if they are unable to fulfil their duty of due diligence, they will be required to refuse the business, or terminate their relationship with the client. They will specifically not have to inform the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS). This is because lawyers do not actually manage flows of money when providing their services (whereas one of the reasons for informing the MROS is so that assets of criminal origin can be tracked and confiscated) and also to avoid endangering the lawyer-client relationship (confidentiality).

Due diligence procedures and KYC obligations might be imposed in the near futur on lawyers.

According to the Federal Council, an auditor will ensure the system is effective. (The idea of using a self-regulation body for lawyers similar to the system in place for financial intermediaries was rejected.) The auditor will be required to inform the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) if they suspect a lawyer of having failed to fulfil their duty of due diligence. The lawyer will be liable for a maximum fine of CHF 500,000 if they have acted intentionally, and CHF 150,000 if they have simply been negligent.

Note also that the Federal Council has decided not to impose due diligence requirements for advisory services relating to property sales or purchases, as it considers the current system sufficient (involvement of banks, notaries, etc.).

Beyond the risk of a loss of confidence between the lawyer and their client, and the ethical questions (is it actually any more morally correct for a lawyer to put together a defence strategy to help a client accused of money laundering escape a prison sentence and carry on their activities unpunished?), this new draft law also poses some practical difficulties.

Given that clients consult lawyers in the initial stages of creating an entity or trust, or even when they are just considering the idea, how can the lawyer be expected to determine in advance whether the structure, once it is created, is going to be used for money laundering or terrorist financing? It is easy to imagine, ten years down the line, the prosecutor saying to the lawyer “Well, you should have known your client intended to use this new company for dubious purposes!”

Without a doubt, the risk of sanctions will discourage many lawyers from giving legal advice in this area – and that appears to be the FATF’s intention.  Evidently, advisors that do risk working in this field will use all possible means of obtaining guarantees from their clients, by having them sign certifications and disclaimers.

The consultation process lasts until 21 September, but we already foresee some very heated debates in parliament!

Are trusts set to become part of the Swiss legal landscape?

Switzerland, a civil law country, already recognizes foreign trusts.

Will trusts be included into Swiss domestic law?

At the end of April, the Council of States Legal Affairs Committee decided to follow its National Council counterpart and pass a committee motion requiring the government to prepare a bill to introduce trusts into internal Swiss law.

As readers will recall, a trust is a legal relationship created when a settlor uses a trust deed to transfer specific assets to one or more people (the trustees), who must manage or use them for a purpose established in advanced by the settlor, for one or more beneficiaries.

Some people are hailing this as a way of reinforcing the attractiveness of Switzerland as a financial centre. We are less convinced; read on to find out why.

Firstly, Switzerland is not, and never will be, a common law country. Although there is a fiduciary concept in Swiss law, it is absolutely not comparable to the notion of a trust, first and foremost because a trust is not a contractual relationship!

Also, our civil code makes no distinction between legal ownership and equitable ownership. So we would have to start by reforming the real rights that exist under Swiss law before we could integrate the concept of a trust. None of the civil law jurisdictions that have attempted such a reform have really managed to make this type of structure stand. The opposite is also true; the foundation, a stalwart of civil law, has never been significant in English-speaking countries.

In any case, trust companies have not waited for us to incorporate trusts into Swiss law to set up here. There are three separate reasons for the high number of trustees in Switzerland:

  1. At present, trusts are very lightly regulated in Switzerland compared to jurisdictions such as Singapore or the Cayman Islands, where a licence can cost up to USD 100,000 per year. In Switzerland, no authorisation or specific qualifications are needed to be a trustee, and in fact no financial guarantees are even required (insurance, capital, etc.). Trust companies are subject only to anti-money laundering and terrorist financing rules. However, this situation is set to change radically when the new Swiss laws on financial services and financial institutions (LSFin and LEFin) come into force;
  2. Unlike in other countries including the UK, in Switzerland trustees are not taxed on the trust’s income and assets, which makes life considerably easier;
  3. Switzerland is recognised across the globe as a financial centre where clients can hold and manage their trust assets with complete peace of mind (in banks, with wealth managers, etc.).

As the information above shows, it is perfectly possible for a trust to be based in Switzerland but subject to the law of a foreign country. Integrating trusts into local law is not going to attract more of them to the country.

In addition, will Swiss law be able to offer settlors the same flexibility as Bahamian, Cayman Island or Cook Island law, in particular as regards protection against creditors and inheritance planning? Although trusts were initially used for tax planning purposes, make no mistake: their primary purpose today is most definitely inheritance planning and protection against creditors when engaging in risky activities (including marriage). However, our legal system has rigid and well-established traditions relating to statutory inheritance entitlements, divorce settlements and claims for fraudulent conveyance or action to set a transaction aside in a bankruptcy. It is unlikely that the Swiss legislator will create gaping exceptions for trusts, just to make Switzerland more attractive as a financial centre. Consequently, we can legitimately wonder in what sense such legislation would be useful.

It is pointless to argue that it would offer clients a reputable jurisdiction in which to domicile their trusts, because the options already include the UK, Singapore, New Zealand and the USA.

It is also important to consider the tax angle. Although there is a Swiss Tax Conference circular regarding the tax treatment of trusts in Switzerland, it is clear that the tax authorities, be they federal or cantonal, pay very little heed to such structures. In the vast majority of cases they are treated as transparent and taxation is calculated as if the assets belonged to the settlor or the beneficiaries.

We must also add that it will take numerous years for courts to build up a reliable set of precedents in this area.

And finally, it would also be necessary to reform Swiss foundation law: currently, with the exception of foundations operating in the public interest, family foundations can serve only to meet the cost of raising, endowing and supporting family members. Incorporating only charitable trusts into internal law would not be a significant change, because the current law on charitable foundations already serves this purpose very well.

For all these reasons, we believe that unless trust law is completely overhauled, the confusion and insecurity generated by integrating such structures into our legal system would outweigh any benefits. In our opinion, recognition of foreign trusts is all that is required. Given that Switzerland ratified the Hague Convention in 2007, nothing further is needed.

The end of the road for bearer shares in Switzerland?

Last Wednesday, the Swiss Federal Council opened a consultation (lasting until 24 April 2018) into discontinuing bearer shares in Swiss companies limited by shares not quoted on the stock exchange. The draft bill will be debated by parliament in autumn 2018. If it becomes law, existing bearer shares will be converted automatically into registered shares. Companies will be required to adapt their articles of association within two years of the new law being passed.

Companies will also be required to keep a register of beneficial owners of shares (family name, given name and address). Failure on the part of a shareholder to report information and failure on the part of a company to keep a register will become criminal offences (new). A shareholder, creditor or registrar may also bring a case before a civil judge to have this failing in company procedures rectified.

Scrapping bearer shares would represent a minor revolution for Switzerland. It would bring our country into line with other financial centres such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, Hong Kong and the USA. However, it is important to understand that this change is not a Swiss initiative. It is a result of pressure from the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which seems to assume that all human beings have criminal intentions. Switzerland’s aim is to adapt its law to ensure the ticks go in the right boxes (and sanctions are avoided) during its next Peer Review, due to begin in the second half of 2018.

From a legal point of view, it is true that new provisions introduced by the FATF law on 1 July 2015 have brought bearer shares and registered shares very close together, to the point that the two securities have become almost identical in terms of anonymity and transfers. Consequently, the formal abolition of bearer shares as outlined in the project would not fundamentally alter shareholders’ rights and obligations.

Under the current law, anyone who buys bearer shares is required to inform the company within one month. They are required to provide their given name and family name (for an individual) or business name (for a legal entity) together with their address.

If, following the acquisition, one person or entity holds 25% of the share capital or voting rights, the identity of the beneficial owner must also be disclosed.

The buyer must produce an official piece of photographic ID (passport, identity card or driving licence) or a copy of a Commercial Register entry. Proof of share purchase is also required.

If anything is missing, the shareholder’s membership rights (e.g. voting rights) and their economic rights (payment of dividends) in relation to the shares are suspended until all the obligations have been fulfilled.

Under the new draft legislation, holders of bearer shares who have not informed the company of their identity as outlined above are required to rectify the situation within 18 months of the law entering into force so that their shares can be converted. If they have not communicated their details within this period of time, their rights to the bearer shares will cease definitively and the shares will be cancelled. The board of directors will then issue the company’s own shares to replace them. These will be paid up using contributions gained by the company as a result of the cancellation. The company is then free to use the replacement shares as it sees fit, by selling them, distributing them to shareholders, cancelling them and reducing the share capital, keeping them, etc.

In addition, limited companies (and also sole proprietorships, partnerships, branches and other legal entities) will be required to hold a bank account in Switzerland if they made sales of CHF 100,000 or more during the previous financial year. The idea of this is to bring companies within the scope of Swiss legislation against money laundering, because bankers are required to check the identity of contracting partners and beneficial owners.

Furthermore, as well as the authorities, financial intermediaries will be permitted to consult company registers (register of shareholders and beneficial owners) for the purposes of fulfilling their legal obligations. The idea of creating a central electronic register of owners of registered shares has been rejected at this time.

Finally, holders of registered powers of attorney representing Swiss branches of companies based abroad will be required to have access to information regarding shareholders of the main company abroad and the beneficial owners of the shares, and to be able to communicate this information to financial intermediaries and the authorities. This obligation is a simple legal prescription, with no sanctions attached. However, financial intermediaries will no doubt refuse to enter into a business relationship with a company that is unable to provide the information.

As we have outlined above, the consequences of this modification on Swiss company law will be minor. The impact is above all psychological, as the right to anonymity has existed since 1936. However, it is regrettable to see supranational bodies once again dictating changes in Swiss law. In addition, there is no guarantee that all these measures will work. A determined criminal will happily create a false document and use a nominee company to hold shares. The threat of a fine will prove little deterrent.

In Switzerland, a company limited by shares is known as a société “anonyme”. Perhaps the time has come for a new name…

Seasons Greetings

CROCE & Associés SA wishes you and your loved ones Happy Holidays and a New Year filled with health, peace and happiness.

We look forward to seeing you again in January 2018.

Happy New Year 2018

New transaction reports for securities trading from 2018

From January 2018, the Swiss Financial Market Infrastructure Act (RS 958.1, FMIA) which came into force in early 2016, will require participants admitted to a trading venue (Swiss securities dealers, foreign participants authorised by the FINMA, etc.) to report all the information required for the transparent trading of securities.

Similar requirements are already in place or will be added (depending on the types of counterparty) for OTC and ET derivatives. These will not be covered here.

Trading platforms (which in practice are the SIX Swiss Exchange, and the BX Berne eXchange) and multilateral trading facilities will be required to supervise price formation and the transactions conducted within their venues more closely to detect insider trading, price and market manipulation and any other violations of statutory or regulatory provisions. If a violation is suspected, the FINMA and possibly the relevant prosecuting authority will be informed.

Non-admitted securities traders will also be subject to the same transparent trading and reporting rules (article 15 paragraph 2 of the Federal Law on Stock Exchanges (LBVM; RS 954.1)).

Reporting requirements apply to all of a participant’s securities transactions (sale, purchase, etc.), whether proprietary or carried out on behalf of a client.

The following must be reported:

    • the title and number of securities bought or sold;
    • the volume and the date and time at which the transaction was concluded;
    • the price;
    • information required to establish the identity of the beneficial owner (new!).

The notion of beneficial owner will be the same as that used for provisions against money laundering.

However, operating legal entities, foundations and collective investments schemes will be identified by an internationally standardised Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). If no LEI is available, the BIC (business identifier code) or Commercial Register number, preceded by the country code, may be used. In the case of a trust, the trustee should be declared.

For natural persons, the nationality (country code), date of birth and a confidential identification number created by the participant will be used. This means that the person’s family name and given name will not be reported.

SIX Swiss Exchange is located in Zurich and trades most of the Swiss securities

However, the system will be different for transactions on the European market (including for Swiss residents): under MiFID II/MiFIR, the first five letters of the person’s given name and family name must be reported (CONCAT code). Nevertheless, an identifier such as a passport number, personal number or social security number can be used and has been adopted by numerous EU countries that do not use CONCAT codes.

Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) and voluntary tax disclosure in Switzerland

The Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA) said in a policy statement on 13 September 2017 that from 30 September 2018 it would no longer accept a voluntary tax disclosure regarding elements covered by the automatic exchange of information (AEOI).

The FTA considers that information obtained under the AEOI will be known to the authorities by this date at the latest, and that consequently taxpayers disclosing the information after this date will be doing so solely because they know that the authorities are aware of their irregular tax situations.

For exchange of information arising after 2017, this rule will apply by analogy from 30 September of the year during which the relevant AEOI first occurred.

The statement does not apply to other situations and for these there is no fixed timescale for voluntary tax disclosure. (For example, voluntary disclosure by a taxpayer resident in Switzerland regarding a domestic bank account, as automatic exchange of information does not operate within the country.)

As you will be aware, voluntary tax disclosure is a procedure under which a taxpayer who has omitted to disclose elements of their income or wealth can correct their tax situation without incurring a penalty or criminal proceedings (late payment interest is however due). This procedure also applies to heirs. It covers both cantonal and communal taxes and direct federal tax.

Conditions for using the procedure are as follows:

  • the disclosure must be being made voluntarily and for the first time;
  • no tax authority may be aware of the omission;
  • the taxpayer must cooperate fully with the tax authorities to determine the back taxes to be paid;
  • the taxpayer must make every effort to pay the back taxes due.

The information that was omitted is assessed for tax for the previous ten years (for example, if the disclosure is made in 2017, back taxes will be due for the tax periods from 2007 to 2016).

For heirs (who can act independently of one another), back taxes are due only for the three tax periods before the date of death, making the procedure highly advantageous.

This simplified back tax procedure does not apply to estates which are officially liquidated or liquidated under bankruptcy rules.

For all subsequent voluntary tax disclosures, the fine is reduced to one fifth of the tax not paid, if all the other conditions listed above are fulfilled.

If the FTA becomes aware of a failure to pay tax other than via a voluntary tax disclosure, the taxpayer risks:

  • additional tax for the last ten years, plus default interest,
  • a fine of between one third of and three times the tax not paid,
  • criminal proceedings.

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CROCE & Associés SA regularly assists individuals in their voluntary tax disclosure process. A preliminary in-depth study is made in coordination with the banks, trustees and public notaries to compile the data and to evaluate the costs of the voluntary tax disclosure, so that the client can make an informed decision.

The corporate tax reform in the canton of Vaud will be effective in 2019.

Switzerland: The government of the canton of Vaud has just announced that the corporate tax reform (“CTR III“) will enter into force on the 1st of January 2019, without waiting for the federal tax project to be adopted (“Tax Proposal 17“).

So, from 2019, the total effective rate of tax on profits (Confederation, canton and municipality) for legal entities domiciled in Vaud will be 13.79% (compared to the current rate of 22.3%).

In addition, a single rate of tax on capital will be adopted, at 0.6‰ (0.06%) (Tax on profits will continue to be credited against tax on capital).

These changes will place the canton of Vaud among the most fiscally attractive places in the world for companies (ahead of Hong Kong, Singapore, London etc.) without being considered a tax haven.

In addition to changes to tax rates, other measure are planned, firstly to compensate for the reduction in tax revenues (CHF128 million annually), and secondly to sustain jobs and maintain families’ living standards.

So, Vaud canton intends to increase family allowances, reduce health charges and boost government funding for childcare. In addition, the canton plans measures to reduce rental value of the real estate properties.

Almost two-thirds of the cost of the corporate tax reform will be met by the private sector, in the form of higher employers’ social contributions.

Le Conseil fédéral décide d’augmenter les contingents de permis de travail pour les extra-européens

Bonne nouvelle ! Le gouvernement suisse a annoncé vendredi dernier qu’il augmentait les contingents de permis de séjour délivrés aux travailleurs extra-européens.

Ainsi, 500 permis supplémentaires seront octroyés l’an prochain, soit 3500 permis B (+500) et 4500 permis L de courte durée.

Ces autorisations seront versées à la réserve fédérale, c’est-à-dire que les cantons, dans l’hypothèse où ils auraient épuisé leurs quotas annuels, pourront demander au Secrétariat d’Etat aux migrations (SEM) des permis supplémentaires. Cette mesure permettra aux autorités fédérales d’adapter avec souplesse et selon la demande, les besoins complémentaires des cantons.

C’est un soulagement pour les cantons de Bâle-Ville, Genève et Zurich, eux qui avaient déjà atteint cette année la totalité de leurs contingents en janvier, février et mars respectivement.

Nous saluons également cette démarche qui permettra de tenir – un peu plus – compte des besoins de l’économie et des entreprises. La nécessité d’une main-d’œuvre qualifiée en provenance d’État tiers n’a jamais été aussi forte dans notre pays.

Pour rappel, les ressortissants de l’Union européenne/AELE ne sont pas soumis à des contingents (sauf exceptions) et disposent d’un droit à séjourner et à travailler en Suisse, en vertu de l’Accord sur la libre circulation des personnes (ALCP). En revanche, les citoyens d’Etats tiers doivent démontrer servir les intérêts économiques de la Suisse et disposer de qualifications professionnelles particulières pour se voir délivrer le précieux sésame. En générale, les permis de travail sont accordés en priorité aux grandes multinationales (lobby oblige), aux personnes actives dans la recherche, les sciences, l’informatique ainsi qu’aux étudiants sortant des hautes écoles (EPF, etc.).

A noter encore que le Conseil fédéral a aussi décidé d’augmenter les contingents pour les prestataires de services provenant de l’Union européenne/AELE et dont la durée de la mission en Suisse dépasse 120 jours par an (ces personnes ne bénéficient pas de l’ALCP et sont soumises à des quotas).

Les limites ont été fixées à 500 permis B (+250) et 3000 permis L (+1000), soit un retour à la situation de 2014. Leur attribution continuera de se faire sur une base trimestrielle.

Le Département fédéral de justice et police (DFJP) procèdera aux modifications nécessaires de l’OASA d’ici à la fin de novembre. Il soumettra ensuite son projet au Conseil fédéral pour décision.

Pour plus d’informations cliquez ici.

Tax crimes and money laundering – Current situation in Singapore

Following the adoption of the new recommendations of FATF (Financial Action Task Force) in February 2012, Singapore decided to include in its legislation serious tax offences as predicate offences for money laundering.

Initiated already in September 2011, this measure is designed to strengthen the credibility of the financial centre on the international scene. More particularly, it is part of the government’s determination to make Singapore a clean and transparent business hub and to prevent the city-state from becoming a haven for tax fraudsters.

On 9 October 2012, the MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) issued a consultation paper for financial intermediaries (banks, insurance companies, independent asset managers, trust companies, etc.). They were given the deadline of 9 December 2012 by which they could take position. In a release on 28 March 2013, the MAS replied to the feedback received and provided a few welcome clarifications; these are set out below. The final bill should be adopted by Parliament within the next few weeks.

Like Hong Kong, Australia and the United Kingdom that have already taken measures, Singapore must amend its domestic legislation in order to define what it means by “serious tax crimes”.

The following Acts are notably concerned:

–       the “Income Tax Act” (s.96 and s.96A);

–       the “Goods and Services Tax Act” (s.62 and s.63) and;

–       the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA).

According to the Income Tax Act, there is tax evasion and fraud when:

s.96 Tax Evasion

 

(1) Any person who wilfully with intent to evade or to assist any other person to evade tax:

(a) omits from a return made under this Act any income which should be included;

(b) makes any false statement or entry in any return made under this Act or in any

notice made under s.76(8);

(c) gives any false answer, whether verbally or in writing, to any question or request for information asked or made in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or

(d) fails to comply with s.76(8)

 

s.96A Serious Fraudulent Tax Evasion

 

(1) Any person who wilfully with intent to evade or to assist any other person to evade tax:

(a) prepares or maintains or authorises the preparation or maintenance of any false books of account or other records or falsifies or authorises the falsification of any books of account or records; or

(b) makes use of any fraud, art or contrivance or authorises the use of any such fraud, art or contrivance

 

It emerges from the above that not only tax fraud is targeted by this draft legislation but also simple evasion.

Moreover, you will note that the draft provides for increased cooperation between Singapore and jurisdictions that have signed international agreements on mutual assistance in criminal and administrative matters.

For financial intermediaries the stakes are double:

–       Firstly, they risk heavy sanctions if they assist their clients to fraudulently evade taxes in any way whatsoever.

–       Secondly, they have the duty to inform the criminal prosecution authorities in the case of suspicions of tax evasion. To this end, they must put in place internal control procedures to ensure that the deposited assets do not stem from tax crimes.

Financial intermediaries are not, however, required to determine with certitude that their clients fully comply with their tax obligations. They must, on the other hand, examine whether there are sufficient reasons to suspect that the deposited assets are the proceeds of serious tax offences. The distinction is important.

This new regulation concerns both new and existing bank accounts.

The provisions of the draft are also intended to apply to offences committed both in Singapore and abroad (“foreign serious offence”). The concept of “foreign serious offence” is defined in the Act as follows (art. 2 CDSA):

“foreign serious offence” means an offence (other than a foreign drug trafficking offence) against the laws of, or of a part of, a foreign country stated in a certificate purporting to be issued by or on behalf of the government of that country and the act or omission constituting the offence or the equivalent act or omission would, if it had occurred in Singapore, have constituted a serious offence;

As regards tax offences committed abroad, this definition poses the problem of dual criminal liability. In fact, only offences also punishable in Singapore are targeted by the bill. However, unlike countries such as France or Italy, Singapore applies a lighter tax burden based on territorial taxation. In particular, gifts, inheritances and wealth are not taxed.

It is apparent, from reading the draft bill, that Singapore only considers tax offences relating to income tax and VAT to be serious tax offences.

Taking this distinction into account, MAS imagined three difference scenarios:

1)    The financial intermediary is certain that the tax offence committed abroad concerns a type of tax also levied in Singapore. In this case, the financial intermediary is required to file a “Suspicious Transaction Report” (STR) and will benefit from the immunity granted by the Act (no violation of bank secrecy if the suspicions prove to be unfounded).

2)    The financial intermediary is uncertain as to whether or not the tax offence committed concerns a category of tax levied in Singapore. In this case, the financial intermediary is also required to report the case and will be protected by the Act.

3)    Finally, if the financial intermediary is certain that the tax evasion concerns a type of tax that is not levied in Singapore, he is not bound to file a STR but is free to do so. On the other hand, he will not benefit from the protection granted by the Act and lays himself open to the risk of legal action by the client. This approach is justified by the fact that, from the Singapore point of view, such a breach of foreign law is not considered to be a serious tax offence in Singapore.

Consequently, it is not very likely that a financial intermediary would take the risk of reporting a client that he suspects has not declared a gift, an inheritance or part of his wealth. However, for obvious reasons of reputation, the financial intermediary should require the account to be closed.

The question is more complicated in the case of dividends or capital gains not declared in the client’s country of residence. In fact, although the latter can be defined as “income”, they are not taxed in Singapore.  This therefore raises the question as to whether the financial intermediary is required to file a report with the authorities.  At the present time, MAS has not clarified this point, but the definitive draft bill will, no doubt, provide an answer.

As indicated above, at organizational level financial intermediaries are required to put in place internal control procedures to identify whether deposited funds stem from tax offences.  As regards methods of investigation, financial intermediaries must adopt a risk-based approach by applying the so-called “red-flag indicators” method, that is to say by using indicators or special criteria to detect possible cases of tax evasion or tax fraud.

“Red flag” indicators are notably:

–       Clients residing in high-risk countries, such as the United States, Canada, the European Union and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland.

–       The use of unusual or unduly complex structures (use of FVC, nominee shareholders or other opaque vehicles).

–       The client’s request for the financial intermediary to keep bank correspondence (“hold mail”).

–       Regular cash deposits or withdrawals.

–       The client’s refusal to sign a self-declaration of tax compliance. It should be noted, however, that such a declaration does not exempt the financial intermediary from checking the truth and credibility of what the client says. In all circumstances, other fully independent investigations are necessary.

–       The emergence of negative factors (client who has undergone investigations, legal proceedings or convictions for tax fraud) following checks on the Internet, world-check, etc.

–       The fact that the client has no links with Asia (investments, work, etc.)

–       No face-to-face meetings with the client.

–       Suspicious transactions on dormant bank accounts.

–       The fact that more funds are paid into the account than was initially indicated to the financial intermediary when the account was opened.

–       The client’s decision to manage directly his assets from his country of residence without resorting to services of local banks or external asset managers.

 

It should be noted that this list of criteria is not exhaustive and that MAS will, no doubt, fix guidelines at a later date.

The new legislation should come into force for 1 July 2013. This clearly means that as of this date, any financial intermediary must not only refuse any new business relationship presenting risks of fraud but is also required to freeze deposited assets and report to the criminal prosecution authorities any client whose funds he knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect, are proceeds of a serious tax crime.

Based on the criteria indicated above, banks and other financial intermediaries are currently fully examining each account opened or business relationship established with their establishment.

Concretely, the Code of Conduct adopted by the Private Banking Industry Group (PBIG) of Singapore recommends an approach in four stages:

1)    Firstly, the financial intermediary must investigate the client using the Internet or any other database to check whether any legal proceedings have been taken or rulings made against the latter in his or her country of residence.

2)    Then the financial intermediary is required to ask the client all necessary questions and evaluate independently the truth of the information provided in order to be sure that the funds do not result from tax offences. The reasons that have led the customer to establish the business relationship must also be considered.

3)    The financial intermediary must also consult, to the best of his ability, foreign tax legislation.

4)    Finally, in the event of a complex structure, the financial intermediary is required to clearly identify all ultimate beneficial owners and to understand the aims of the aforesaid to be sure that the objective is not to evade taxes.

Once this procedure has been completed, each customer is then classed in one of three categories, that is to say a client presenting a low risk (green list), an average risk (orange list) or a high risk (red list) in respect to tax evasion. MAS must have access to these constantly updated lists.

Relationships that fall into the orange-list category require additional investigations and clarifications by the client. Financial intermediaries have an initial deadline of June 2014 to accomplish this task and are required to prove that a client does not fall into the red-list category.

As for clients who fall into the red-list category, they must close their accounts, bring themselves into tax compliance or prove to the intermediary that they have put their situation in order by 1 July next. Thereafter, the financial intermediaries will report the cases to the authorities.

Finally, we will note that legislation requires ongoing monitoring of clients’ accounts by financial intermediaries as well as periodic assessments of tax-related risks. Moreover, it requires adequate staff training and the implementation of an independent structured escalation procedure (management reporting duty, independent staff responsible for tax checks, adequate documentation and written proof, etc.).

Tax crimes and money laundering-a new focal point for FATF

By Lorenzo CROCE, member of the Geneva Bar, LL.M.

 

Having already been significantly threatened by the inclusion of article 26 OECD Model Tax Convention in the new Double Imposition Conventions negotiated by Switzerland and the disclosure of 4000 UBS client names to the American Internal Revenue, Swiss banking secrecy is at risk of becoming eternally dead and buried in the next few months following a staggering new proposition from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

 

The FATF has just established a preliminary-draft in order to qualify tax crimes as predicate offences for money laundering. In short, if such a proposition should come about, this would mean that any person who has accepted a deposit, helped to transfer or manage funds in the knowledge or on the presumption that these funds were the result of tax offences, risks being prosecuted for money laundering in accordance with article 305 of the Swiss Penal Code. As for the financial intermediaries, they will be obligated to systematically declare suspected tax offences to the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS).

 

Even though a formal decision has not yet been made, there is every reason to believe that this proposition will be adopted at the FATF plenary assembly at the end of 2011 within the scope of a partial revision of its standards. In light of the financial crisis, there is mounting international pressure, notably from the G20 countries. However, it must be stressed that this proposition is not aimed at combating organised crime. It is nothing other than a simple pretext. Under the pretext of fighting against money laundering, the true aim is a recovery of state funds by transforming the banks and other financial intermediaries into foreign tax officers. Therefore, no more need to pay out millions to buy CDs of stolen data!

 

However, this criminalisation of the economic world is neither desirable nor justified. One could admit that the channels worked for laundering capital are consistently the same as those used to try to conceal money from Inland Revenue, but the similarities between tax offences and money laundering stop there.

 

Money laundering involves reintroducing criminal money into the economic cycle through processes which aim to cover the source of the money.

 

Yet, as regards concealed funds from the Inland Revenue, these clearly have legal origins (revenue, wealth, succession, donation etc.). It is not a question of concealing illegal patrimonial values by imparting an apparent legal justification upon them, but rather avoiding the control by tax authorities of funds which have a legal source. It therefore appears doubtful that money resulting from tax offences could then be laundered.

 

Furthermore, in Switzerland only crimes, that is offences punishable with a prison sentence of more than three years, are likely to constitute predicate offences for money laundering. As a result, if the proposition made by FATF does indeed materialise, it would be necessary to establish tax offences in crime. Yet the seriousness of these offences, particularly tax evasion, is not comparable to that of other crimes connected to laundering. It is disproportionate to place money laundering resulting from tax offences on the same footing as laundering resulting from drug trafficking, terrorism or prostitution.

 

Whatever it may be, the implementation of this proposition runs the risk of creating significant difficulties.

 

First of all, it will be necessary to determine what is included under the term “tax offences”. In this respect, FATF has voluntarily refrained from elaborating on this notion – aside from the fact that it targets both direct and indirect taxes – leaving each country to decide for themselves what is to be understood by this term in relation to their domestic law. So what will Switzerland decide? Will it establish limited amounts or will it enact a catalogue of crimes? Will tax evasion be part of this and if necessary, where will the line be drawn between tax planning, legal practice and evasion? According to the Ambassador Alexandre Karrer, who is in charge of the Swiss case within FATF, “tax crimes must implicitly be reserved to significant offences such as a falsification of accounts or the embezzlement of money”. However, it remains doubtful that Switzerland will resist international pressure and it is possible that tax evasion will be considered as a predicate offence for money laundering.

 

The adoption of the new regulation will also pose problems in terms of investigations. In a practical sense, how can financial intermediaries ensure that the funds received from their client have been declared to the Inland Revenue? Will it be necessary for the client to sign a standard form or will they have to request a declaration certificate from the foreign tax authorities knowing that tax declarations are generally not granted until several years after the acquisition of revenue? Similarly, how can financial intermediaries lead the necessary investigation on funds which have been transferred from generation to generation?

 

There are so many questions which remain unanswered.

 

On an organisational plan, it will be, under all circumstances, necessary to hire and train a significant number of collaborators both at the level of the authorities and the financial intermediaries. This measure will lead to considerable supplementary costs which will be directly passed onto the client. This in turn runs the risk of eroding the competitive Swiss financial position as, unlike certain countries, Switzerland wants to be seen as performing well and there is no doubt whatsoever, that it will rigorously implement this new regulation.

 

We have seen that it is neither justified nor desirable to subject tax offences to articles 305bis and 305ter of the Swiss Penal Code as well as to the Swiss Federal Law concerning the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the financial sector. The new FATF proposition is solely aimed at allowing the acquisition of funds by the foreign tax authorities and not the fight against organised crime. What is even worse is the significant risk of weakening the system because of the tidal wave of communications to MROS which will probably happen. Furthermore, beyond the generated costs, this proposition is extremely complicated to implement, particularly for the financial intermediaries who solely have access to limited investigative means to exert their due diligence.

 

Ultimately, there are other effective solutions to actively fight against tax fraud. Indeed, Switzerland has already undertaken such measures by providing assistance, not only in cases of fraud but also in cases of tax evasion. Furthermore, the setting up of a discharge tax at the outset (“Rubik” project) is currently under discussion with Germany and England and would allow a definitive resolution of the problem while safeguarding the Swiss banking secrecy. It is therefore necessary to take advantage of this approach rather than abusively using the system of fighting against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.